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Professor Ross joined Polytechnic University as the Leonard J. Shustek Chair Professor in Computer Science in January 2003. He has been Department Head since September 2008. Before joining Polytechnic, he was a professor for five years at Eurecom Institute and a professor for 13 years at the University of Pennsylvania. He holds a PhD from the University of Michigan.
Professor Ross has worked in peer-to-peer networking, Internet measurement, video streaming, Web caching, multi-service loss networks, content distribution networks, network security, voice over IP, optimization, queuing theory, and Markov decision processes. He is an IEEE Fellow, recipient of the Infocom 2009 Best Paper Award (1,435 papers submitted), and recipient of Best Paper in Multimedia Communications 2006-2007 (awarded by IEEE Communications Society). He is currently associate editor for IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, and has served on numerous journal editorial boards and conference program committees. He was PC co-chair for ACM Multimedia 2002, ACM CoNext 2008, and IPTPS 2009.
Professor Ross is co-author (with James F. Kurose) of the popular textbook, Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach Featuring the Internet, published by Addison-Wesley (first edition in 2000, fifth edition 2009). It is the most popular textbook on computer networks and has been translated into fourteen languages. Professor Ross is also the author of the research monograph, Multiservice Loss Models for Broadband Communication Networks, published by Springer in 1995. From July 1999 to July 2001, Professor Ross took a leave of absence to found and lead Wimba, an Internet technology start-up. Wimba voice and video applications primarily for the on-line education and language learning markets. Wimba is now headquartered in NYC and has more than 80 employees worldwide.
Talk:
Incentives for P2P Applications: What’s in it for Me?
Although P2P has proven itself as a viable architectural paradigm for a variety of large-scale distributed applications, P2P is far from reaching its full potential. Peers possess surplus bandwidth, storage and CPU resources, which when aggregated together across all peers worldwide, constitute a huge, untapped resource pool. The success of future P2P applications ultimately depends on convincing users to contribute these resources, which is the challenge of P2P incentive design.
BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat incentive scheme is commendable in that it has been deployed on a massive scale. However, from an economic perspective, tit-for-tat is highly inefficient, since it requires peers to trade synchronously. We believe that the next generation of P2P incentive mechanisms should incorporate some notion of “money,” which users can accumulate for providing services, and later spend for acquiring services.
In this talk I will survey two promising lightweight incentive schemes, allowing P2P users to accumulate money and trade asynchronously. The first scheme, called Network Asynchronous Bilateral Trading (NABT), is a fully decentralized, exploits an underlying social network and pairwise currency among pairs of friends. We have shown that NABT is almost as efficient as a perfect economy, where all users can trade directly with each other. The second paradigm, called Closed P2P Communities, is inspired by current practices in BitTorrent darknets. For closed communities, we will show how mechanism design from game theory can be used to design optimal incentive schemes, and how the notion of entropy get be used to combat colluders.
This is joint work with Yong Liu and Zhengye Liu
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