

# Towards Emergency Networks Security with Per-Flow Queue Rate Management

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# The PPDR-TC project: Public Protection and Disaster Relief - Transformation Center

## PPDR-TC goals

- Effective Public Protection & Disaster Relief (PPDR) communications
- Preparation of the next generation of PPDR systems

## The Consortium:

The logo for EXUS, featuring the word "EXUS" in a bold, black, sans-serif font with a red horizontal bar under the "X".The logo for THALES, consisting of the word "THALES" in a bold, black, sans-serif font.The logo for teletel TELECOMS TECHNOLOGY, featuring the word "teletel" in a stylized, italicized font and "TELECOMS TECHNOLOGY" in a smaller font below it.The logo for ITTI e-technologies & business, featuring the word "ITTI" in a bold, green, sans-serif font and "e-technologies & business" in a smaller font below it.The logo for takever, featuring a gear icon and the word "takever" in a bold, black, sans-serif font.

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The logo for TELECOMS TECHNOLOGY CENTRAS, featuring a blue circular icon with white lines and the text "TELECOMS TECHNOLOGY CENTRAS" below it.

# Talk overview

- 1 Introduction
  - Problem
  - Real Example
  - State-of-the-art
- 2 Buffer management
  - Description
- 3 Results
- 4 Conclusions

# Problem

## what

to support PPDR communications

- QoS guarantees
- attack prevention

## why


resources are precious after a disaster

- satellite tech are often the only one solution (TCP problems)
- malicious users make things more challenging


## where

cooperative network layer: buffer management

# Problem: simple PPDR scenario



# Effect of an attack over cooperative environment



# State of the Art

## typical solution


Network layer techniques: AQM or Packet Scheduler

- Scheduling is useless with same traffic type
- In satellite environment, TCP congestion is the critical point


## weaknesses

- difficult to bound the bandwidth
  - packets in the queue → IP level
  - bandwidth (congestion control) → TCP level
- how to move from packets burst to bandwidth?
- flooding attack cannot be managed by packet schedulers

# AQM classical schema



# AQM classical schema



## Proposed solution: Queue Rate Management (QRM)

- simple AQM placed at networking layer
- born for cooperative networks (node-rate given)
  - RCP-AC, XPLIT, ECN, CCML (Satellite, Data Centers, etc)
  - malicious node could exceed it
  - QRM node-rate hypothesis not strong
- it traces packets to get the flow RTT and calculate the actual flow rate


# QRM benefits

- 1 gives control about length and bandwidth in a single queue manager
- 2 deterministic drop policy
- 3 consume  $O(n)$  memory like standard AQM
- 4 time complexity of  $O(n)$ , simulations show a  $\Theta(1)$  behavior (we already have an  $O(1)$  version)
- 5 max queue length is bounded at BDP value  
**(Theorem)**

# PPDR case study



- LTE BandWidth: 20Mbit/s
- Satellite bandwidth 20Mbit/s
- Satellite delay 350ms
- Queue BDP size of 1.8MB
- [2, 32] FRs involved:
- [1, 16] Malicious users

**ns-3**  
NETWORK SIMULATOR





# CoDel vs QRM: Rate and fairness


5 ns-3 client nodes, 1 node is an attacker



# No buffer management vs QRM: RTT and queue length



# QRM Scalability: queue length



# Conclusions

## Buffer Manager: QRM

a novel timestamps based AQM for infer and bound the flow rate


- efficiently insulate malicious traffic (flooding attack)
- effective use of the typical BDP standard buffer-size
- optimal run-time time and space complexity
- preserves all the cooperative feature (QoS, Latency, etc)

thank you  
for your attention


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extra slides

# QRM Defense Scalability: queue length with attackers growth over 32 total nodes



# QRM Worst-case Tx Data: good nodes



# QRM Worst-case Tx Data: good nodes with attackers growth over 32 total nodes

